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Hugh S. Wilkins*

The Justiciability of Climate Change:
A Comparison of US and Canadian
Approaches

Climate change-related disputes, which often include novel, complex, or politically
sensitive matters, have experienced a mixed reception by the courts. Defendants
both in Canada and the United States have raised the issue of justiciabilitythe question of whether a matter is of the quality or state of being appropriate
or suitable for review by a court-with some success in attempts to have these
cases summarily dismissed. The author reviews the types of climate change cases
that have been launched, examines the US and Canadian laws of justiciability
analyzes the.paths in which the caselaw regarding justiciability in these countries
is headed, and suggests how these developments will impact future climate
change cases. This paper finds that Canadian courts may be increasingly using
justiciability as a means to avoid addressing climate change issues-just as US
courts may be beginning to take a more progressive approach.
Les diff6rends qui ont trait au changement climatique, qui souldvent souvent des
questions nouvelles, complexes ou ddlicates sur le plan politique, ont regu un
accueil mitig6 par les tribunaux. Tant au Canada quaux Etats-Unis, les parties
ddfenderesses ont soulev4 la question de justiciabilit&-question de savoir si
une question a le caract~re approprid ou convenable pour 6tre examinde par
un tribunal-et ont rdussi jusqu'd un certain point dans leurs tentatives de voir
les poursuites rejetees sommairement. L'auteur passe en revue les types de
poursuites ayant trait au changement climatique qui ont 6t6 entreprises, examine
les lois des Etats-Unis et les lois du Canada en matidre de justiciabilitd, analyse
la direction que prend la jurisprudence relative & la justiciabilitd dans ces pays
et avance des hypoth~ses sur les incidences de ces ddveloppements sur les
futures poursuites mettant en cause le changement climatique. 11constate
que les tribunaux canadiens pourraient de plus en plus invoquer la question
de justiciabilitd comme moyen d'dviter de se pencher sur les questions ayant
trait au changement climatique-alors que les tribunaux am6ricains pourraient
commencer &adopter une approche plus progressive.

* Staff Lawyer, Ecojustice; Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author would like to
thank Lome Sossin, Meinhard Doelle, Jennifer Agnolin, and Lynda Collins for their comments on the
paper. All errors and omissions in the paper are the author's own.
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Introduction
A court is generally viewed as a forum in which disputes are adjudicated
and justice is administered.' Thus, where there is harm caused by one
person to another or where a person has not complied with the law, one
would expect that a court would be an appropriate place for resolving the
dispute and correcting wrongs.
Yet courts have traditionally been reluctant to engage on issues
and to resolve disputes that are novel, complex, or may have political
ramifications. For instance, in the context of scientific complexity, Justice
Rehnquist of the US Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee v Illinois
stated that the complexity of the environmental problems at issue made
them unsuitable for the courts to address, and noted that the lower court
had found that the expert testimony was "over the heads of all of us." 2
Similarly, in the context of political sensitivity, Alexander Bickel in his
review of the work of the US Supreme Court highlighted that courts can
be sensitive to the political climate of the country and may make their
judgments accordingly.'
Is it appropriate for courts to decline to engage on issues just because
they are new, difficult, or politically hot? With time and familiarization,
courts do develop the confidence and expertise to address new and
emerging issues, which is evidenced by their adeptness in addressing
technical and scientific issues in areas such as intellectual property law or
medical malpractice. But why is there reluctance at the start?

1. For instance, Samuel Johnson defined "court" as "the hall or chamber where justice is
administered." See Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London: W Strahan,
1778).
2.
City of Milwaukee v Illinois,451 US 304 at 325 (198 1).
3.
Alexander Bickel, "The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Forward: The Passive Virtues" (1961) 75
Harv L Rev 40, quoted in Lome Sossin, Boundaries of JudicialReviev: The Lav of Justiciability in
Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 229.

The Justiciability of Climate Change: A Comparison of
US and Canadian Approaches

531

This issue concerning the willingness of courts to engage on novel,
complex, and sensitive matters is highlighted in the arena of climate
change litigation. The doctrine of justiciability-the question of whether
a matter is of the quality or state of being appropriate or suitable for
review by a court4-has been raised by climate change defendants both
in Canada and the US. With climate change liability and responsibility
seen as novel, complex, and politically "hot button" issues, courts initially
accepted justiciability arguments as bases for having these suits summarily
dismissed.' However, some courts in the US are now beginning to find
climate change claims as justiciable.6
This possible movement away from findings of non-justiciability
for climate change cases has not yet come to Canada. In Friends of the
Earth v Governor in Council, the Canadian Federal Court found that the
Canadian government's non-implementation of federal climate change
legislation was not an appropriate matter for the Court to review-despite
apparently strict legislated deadlines and requirements for government
action under the legislation in question.' This is surprising given the
traditional conception of Canadian rules on justiciability as being less
strict than those in the US. Based on this case, the Canadian courts may
be using justiciability more as a means to avoid addressing issues such as
climate change-just at the time when US courts may be taking a more
liberal approach.
Many courts are unfamiliar with and unprepared to take on the
complexity of climate issues. Courts are traditionally reluctant to enter
into new domains in which there is little precedent and they are often not
4. Blackr Law Dictionary, 7th ed, sub verbo "justiciability".
5.
Edna Sussman, "Climate Change Litigation: Past, Present and Future" (Paper delivered to the
ABA Renewable Energy Resources Committee Programme, 21 June 2006) slides online: ABA <http://
www.americanbar.org>; and see Prue Taylor, "Climate change litigation: A catalyst for corporate
responses," New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law [unpublished] at 1. Other challenges include
difficult issues concerning choice of law, pre-emption (statutory remedies), redress, causation,
apportionment of liability, separation of powers, and international comity. See Shi-Ling Hsu, "A
Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit" (2008)
79 U Colo L Rev 3 at 701. See also Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B Hecht, "Limiting Liability
in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change"
(2007) 43A Stan J Int'l L 251 at 274. Sossin states that justiciability-related issues have been the
greatest obstacles to climate change litigation to date. See Lome Sossin, "Climate Change Litigation
in the US and Canada" (5 October 2008) [unpublished] at 18.
6.
The caselaw is, however, still developing. See, for example, Native Village of Kivalina v
ExxonMobil et al, 663 F Supp 2d 863, 2009 US Dist Lexis 99563 (ND Cal 2009) (notice of appeal
filed Nov 5 2009, No 09-17490) [Kivalina].
7. Friends of the Earth v Minister of the Environment and Governor in Council, [2008] FC 1183,
[2009] 3 FCR 201. An appeal of this decision was denied by the Federal Court of Appeal; see Friends
ofthe Earth v Minister ofthe Environment and Governor in Council, [2009] FCA 297, 313 DLR (4th)
767. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused.
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inclined to develop environmental common law.' This is especially the
case where the ruling government opposes such developments, such as in
Canada concerning climate change. The difficulties in bringing a climate
change suit are still further increased by their complexity and novel nature,
requiring litigants to think beyond conventional legal strategies in bringing
these cases, which will often further dampen a court's enthusiasm.'
This paper focuses on the challenges of establishing justiciability in
climate change suits. It reviews the types of climate change cases being
launched, examines the laws of justiciability in Canada and the US,
analyzes the direction in which each is going, and opines on how these
developments will affect future climate change cases.
1. Backgroundon climate change suits
The growth in climate change-related lawsuits over the past 5 years in the
US has been extraordinary."o Growing public awareness of the issue and
the increasing evidence of the harm attributable to greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions are strengthening the bases for legal action." In 2010, over
130 climate change cases were filed in the US alone.12 Climate change
cases can be based on either substantive or procedural grounds" and, due

Philippe Cullet, "Liability and Redress for Human-Induced Global Warming: Towards an
8.
International Regime" (2007) 26A Stan Envtl LJ 99 at 110.
Hari M Osofsky, "Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?" (2007) 26A Stan
9.
Envtl L J 181 at 236-237.
10. For a more in-depth review of cases, see Justice Brian J Preston, "Climate Change Litigation"
(Paper delivered at the Judicial Conference ofAustralia Colloquium, II October 2008), [unpublished].
11. See Taylor, supra note 5 at 1.
12. Richard Ingham, "Billions of Dollars at Stake in Climate Change Litigation-Law's Latest
Frontier", Agence France Presse (24 January 2011). Note that many of these cases were likely preemption cases aimed at dismantling regulatory actions to combat climate change. This is an increase
from the estimated 200 such cases that were filed in the US between 2004 and 2009.
13. See Jonathon M Hanna, "Oncorhynchus spp: Climate Change, Pacific Northwest Tribes, and
Salmon" (2007) 22 Nat Resources & Env't 13 at 15. An example of a claim based on procedural
grounds is Friends of the Earth v Watson, 2005 US Dist Lexis 42335 (ND Cal 2005).
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to the wide range of climate change impacts, can range in character

tremendously.14
Domestic climate change litigation is generally a product of failed
domestic policy efforts." It provides more than just relief to aggrieved
plaintiffs. It often, whether intentionally or not, also compels stronger

14. See Graham Erion, "The Stock Market to the Rescue? Carbon Disclosure and the Future of
Securities-Related Climate Change Litigation" (2009)18:2 RECIEL 164; see Matt Droz & Robert
Wing, "The Alien Tort Claims Act Will Never be a Viable Vehicle for Addressing Climate Change"
(12 April 2007), online: Holland and Hart LLP <http://www.hhclimatechange.com>; and Hanna,
supra note 13. The focus of this article is on domestic litigation; however, there are various grounds
for proceedings under public international law. Possible claims include those that address general
principles of international law such as the no-harm rule. See Wil Bums et al, "Panel: Climate Change"
(2007) 5 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 462 at 477. Proceedings under the UN Convention
of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
may also be possible. See Timo Koivurova, "International Legal Avenues to Address the Plight of
Victims of Climate Change: Problems and Prospects" (2007) 22 J Envtl L & Litig 267. It has also
been argued that non-ratification of global climate agreements constitutes an illegal subsidy or a
violation of UNCLOS or the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement. See Joyeeta Gupta, "Legal Steps
Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to Address Climate Change" (2007) 16:1
RECIEL 76 at 78; and see Wil Bums, "Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts under
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement" (Winter 2007) 7:2 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 34;
and "Panel: Climate Change" at 474. Claims have also been threatened before Dispute Panels of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), although nothing to date has materialized. See Glen P Peters
& Edgar G Hertwich, "C02 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global Climate
Policy" (2008) 42:5 Environmental Science and Technology 1401; and J de Cendra, "Can Emissions
Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An analysis vis-2-vis WTO law" (2006)
15:2 RECIEL 131. International human rights law could also be applied, as could proceedings under
the World Heritage Convention. See Gupta, ibid at 78; Joseph Smith & David Shearman, Climate
Change Litigation: Analysing the law, scientfic evidence and impacts on the environment, health and
properly (Adelaide: Presidian Legal Publications, 2006) at 55; and Friends of the Earth, Press Release,
"UNESCO: No decision on Everest, but investigation into the climate threat to sites" (13 July 2005)
online: FOE <http://www.foe.ao.uk>.
15. Justin R Pidot, "Global Warming in the Courts: An Overview of Current Litigation and Common
Legal Issues" (2006), online: Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute <http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/gelpt/current-research/documents/GWLReport.pdf>. See also David Grossman,
"Warming Up to a Not-so-Radical Idea: Tort-based Climate Change Litigation" (2003) 28:1 Colum J
Envtl L I at 2.
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government,16 private sector," and perhaps even international" action. It
also draws political and corporate attention to the issues at stake. 9 Eric
Posner explains that:
Litigation can generate press attention, mobilize public interest groups,
galvanize ordinary citizens, and, ultimately, gain compensation for
victims. At a minimum, it creates pressure that might generate wiser
policy, as governments may finally enter treaties in order to reduce the
risk of liability and the public relations costs of litigation.20
Shi-Ling Hsu states that such cases are "potentially a means of regulation
itself, as a finding of liability could have an enormous ripple effect, and send
greenhouse gas emitters scrambling to avoid the unwelcome spotlight." 2 1
The symbolic value of a judicially sanctioned remedy is strong. 22
Generally, there are three main types of domestic litigation that attempt
to combat climate change:2 1

16. This is especially the case in jurisdictions where GHG emissions are not effectively regulated.
See Smith & Shearman, supranote 14 at I1. See also Randall S Abate, "Kyoto or Not, Here We Come:
The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the US" (2006)
15 Cornell J L & Pub Pol'y 369 at 401; see also Pidot, ibid at 5. Others have been less enthusiastic,
noting that litigation is both inefficient and expensive compared with alternatives (see Ross, Mills
& Hecht, supra note 5 at 262) and that litigation does not necessarily lead to better policy than can
be achieved through politics (see Eric A Posner, "Climate Change and International Human Rights
Litigation: A Critical Appraisal" (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1925 at 1944).
17. Smith & Shearman provide a good example where they quote an insurance company, which
announced that it would withdraw coverage of an oil company's climate change liability claims if
adequate risk management policies were not developed and applied. See Smith & Shearman, supra
note 14 at 176.
18. Roda Verheyen asserts that the threat of climate change litigation may inspire the creation of
a liability protocol under the UNFCCC, "rather than expose the private sector and governments to a
variation of legal rules in different jurisdictions." See R Verheyen, "Legal Opinion on whether Canada
is currently in violation of, or is likely to violate, its obligations under the UNFCCCC and/or the Kyoto
Protocol" (30 October 2006), online: Climate Action Network <http://climateactionnetwork.ca>. See
also Gupta, supranote 14 at 85.
19. Smith & Shearman note that plaintiffs to climate change suits are likely to fall into one of two
general categories when grouped according to their objectives: firstly, those seeking compensation
for harm caused by global warming and, secondly, those seeking to use litigation to prevent or reduce
further global warming. See Smith & Shearman, supra note 14 at 12.
20. See Posner, supra note 16 at 1931-1932.
21. See Hsu, supranote 5 at 13.
22. Mini Kaur, "Global Warming Litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act: What Sosa v. Alvarez
Machain and its Progeny mean for Indigenous Arctic Communities" (2006) 13 Wash & Lee J Civ
Rights & Soc J 155.
23.. This is taken from Hsu, supra note 5. Hsu, however, includes a fourth category of "actions
against governmental entities regulating greenhouse gas emissions by those adversely affected by such
regulations." As such cases do not aim to tackle the problem of climate change, they are not included
here. See also Pidot, supra note 15.
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suits that aim to enforce the law;24

b. suits that aim to mainstream climate change in policy making;25
and
c.

suits that seek to compel private sector action to address climate

change.2 6
Suits that aim to enforce the law are generally rare, but they are often
the most successful. In fact, many of these cases have settled due to the
difficulty for a government to avoid compliance with statutory provisions.
They include situations where government has failed to comply with
the laws in the areas of human rights,27 freedom of information,28

24. These include suits that apply legislation such as the US Clean Air Act and the Endangered
Species Act, Freedom ofInformation Act, Clean Water Act, or the CanadianEnvironmentalProtection
Act and Kyoto Pmtocol Implementation Act in Canada. See Michael B Gerrard, "Survey of Climate
Change Litigation" (2007) 238:63 NYLJ; and Sussman, supra note 5.
25. These are mostly environmental impact assessment (EIA) cases.
26. Such as tort suits in nuisance, negligence, and related litigation, including product liability and
corporate liability.
27. For a good review of human rights-related climate change cases, see Marilyn Averill, "Linking
Climate Change and Human Rights" (2009) 18:2 RECIEL 139. Cases include those in Nigeria
regarding the effects of gas flaring (where the court found that flaring breached Nigerian constitutional
rights to life, including a healthy environment, and dignity of the person). See Jonah Gbemre v Shell
Petroleum Development CompanyNigeria Ltd, Nigeria NationalPetroleum CorporationandAttorney
General of the Federation,(2005) AHRLR 152 (NgHC 2005). See also Gupta, supra note 14 at 82.
They also include cases in India regarding the threats of floods caused by climate change, where the
petitioners alleged a breach of their rights to physical integrity and security, life, and preservation of
health due to the threats of floods caused by melting glaciers at an Indian UNESCO World Heritage
Site. There are also cases in international law such as where Inuit petitioners brought proceedings
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging violations to, among other things,
the right to their culture; see Gupta, ibid at 83.
28. Regarding access to information cases, these have focused on situations where a government
that has a statutory obligation to disclose public documents on climate change has refused to do so.
Prominent cases include Centerfor Biological Diversity v Brennan, 2007 WL 2408901 (ND Cal
2007) [Brennan] and Citizens for Responsibility andEthics in Washington v Council on Environment,
No 1:07CV00365 (DDC filed Feb 20 2007). See also Climate Justice Programme, Press Release,
"Climate impacts of German export credits to be disclosed" (2006) online: climatelaw <http://www.
climatelaw.org/media/2006FebO3/>; and "German government sued over climate change" (2004)
online: climatelaw <http://www.climatelaw.org/media/2004Junel5/>; Germanwatch, News Release,
"German government sued over climate change: briefing" (undated) online: germanwatch <http://
germanwatch.org/rio/herbpe04.pdf>.
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pre-emption,2 9 municipal law," investment," transboundary pollution,32
and scientific research," among others. 34
The second type of climate change case-suits that aim to mainstream
climate change in policy making-are mostly environmental impact
assessment (EIA) matters." They have been the most common of the three
types of climate change litigation, but also arguably the least effective. 6
The key issues that are addressed in these cases are the inclusion of impacts
of climate change in environmental assessments and the determination
of whether GHG emissions cause "significant environmental harm.""
These cases have been successful in that some courts have ordered that the

29. The US Supreme Court's Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 127 S Ct 1438
(2007) decision had significant impacts on pre-emption challenges in several US states. These climate
change cases generally address the question of whether US states have the power to adopt the strict
California regulatory scheme for GHG emissions from motor vehicles or whether they are pre-empted
from doing so by the Clean Air Act, and other US laws (see Pidot, "Global Warming in the Courts:
The Massachusetts v EPA Decision and its Implications" (2007) Georgetown Environmental Law and
Policy Institute 5). Since the Massachusettsdecision, courts have been dismissing these pre-emption
claims finding that "both EPA and California... are equally empowered through the Clean Air Act
to promulgate regulations that limit the emissions of greenhouse gases.. .from motor vehicles": see
Central Valley Chrysler-JeepInvv Goldstene, 529 F Supp (2d) 1152 (filed II December 2007); Green
Mountain Chrysler Plymouth, et al v Crombie, 508 F Supp 2d 295 (D Vt 2007); and Lincoln Dodge
Inc v Sullivan, No 1:06CV00070 (DRI filed 13 Feb 2006). However, Massachusettsv EPA may raise
barriers to plaintiffs seeking claims in nuisance as US federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act can
displace the state and federal common law of nuisance. In other words, if the Clean Air Act addresses
GHG emissions, then it may preclude any nuisance remedies. See Pidot, ibid at 5.
30. Tilde Herrera, "Land Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intersect in the Courtroom" (6 August
2008), online: GreenBiz <http://www.greenbiz.com/news/>.
31. See Platform, People and Planet, the World Development Movement v Commissioner of HM
Treasury, (2009) Env HC 5323 (Admin), online: People and Planet <http://peopleandplanet.org>.
32. See Friends of the Earth v Her Majesty the Queen et al, (28 May 2007), Federal T-914-07 (FC)
online: ecojustice <http://www.ecojustice.ca> [parenthentical description of case]; and also C Elwell
& G Boyle, "Friends of the Earth v Minister of the Environment: Does CEPA 166 require Canada to
Meet its Kyoto Commitments?" (2008) 18:3 J Envtl L & Prac 253.
33. These include Brennan,supra note 28.
34. See Gerrard, supranote 24. Interestingly, as noted below, it is regarding compliance with specific
statutorily mandated climate change obligations where these cases have been least successful.
35. There have also been a handful of non-EIA cases that fit in this category of climate change suits.
In BridgepointHealth v Toronto (City) (2007), 35 MPLR (4th) 208, proceedings were commenced
against the municipality for, among other issues, failing to consider the climate change impacts of
demolishing a hospital and building a new one in its place. See Elwell & Boyle, supra note 32 at 258.
For an overview of US climate change and EtA cases, see Michael B Gerrard, "Climate Change and
the Environmental Impact Review Process" (Winter 2008) 22:3 Nat Resources & Env't 20,
36. There have been many climate change suits regarding appeals of EIA findings. See Centerfor
Biological Diversity v NHTSA, 508 F 3d 508, 2007 US App LEXIS 26555 (9th Cir Cal 2007); NRDC
vAbraham 388 F 3d 701 (2d Cir 2004); Montana EnvironmentalInformation Center v EPA, 2007 US
App Lexis 5262, US Cir Ct of App D Col; Friends of the Earth v Watson, No C-02-4106 (ND Cal
2002); Mayo Foundationv Surface TransportationBoard, 472 F 3d 545; 2006 US App LEXIS 31887;
and Border PowerPlant Working Group v Department of Energy, 260 F Supp 2d 997 (SD Cal 2003).
37. See generally, Albert Koehl, "EA and Climate Change Mitigation" (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac
181.
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impugned assessments be sent back to EIA panels to have the impacts of
climate change considered further. Rarely however have courts required
mitigation."
The third type of suits encompasses those that seek to compel
private sector action to address climate change. These are primarily tort
cases." Tort law aims to reduce the societal costs of human activities,
compensate those who have been unduly harmed by those activities, and
provide corrective justice. As noted by one commentator, "tort law is a
residual locus for the airing of grievances when no.. .government actor
is responsive to societal need."40 Climate change tort litigation aims to
transfer the costs of climate change to emitters and compensate those who
have been harmed. 4 1 Climate change actions in private law include those
in nuisance, negligence, 42 breach of fiduciary duty by corporate officers
or directors, 43 securities law, 44 Civil conspiracy, 45 product liability,4 6

38. Nicholas van Aelstyn, "Global Warming NEPA Challenges Likely to Increase" (April 2007)
ABA Public Land and Resources Committee Newsletter 1, online: BD Law <http://www.bdlaw.com/
attomeys-98.html>.
39. The other main type of suit in this category involves the enforcement of environmental statutes.
With few climate change-related laws on the books, it is not surprising that statutory enforcement cases
have been few to date. The few actions brought under statute include claims based on statutory duties of
corporate officers or directors under federal securities law, and claims based on environmental liability
statutes: see Ross, Mills & Hecht, supra note 5 at 254. An example is Northwest Environmental
Defense Center v Owens Corning,434 F Supp 2d 957 (D Org 2006). Some commentators have also
suggested the use of criminal law (s 219 of the CanadianCriminal Code) to target criminally negligent
climate change actors: see William E Rees, "Is Canada Criminally Negligent on Climate Policy?"
(2009) online: The Tyee <http://thetyee.ca>.
40. See Douglas Kysar, "SCOTUS Grants Cert in AEP v Connecticut; Why the Threat of Tort
Liability Should Remain as Part of the Balance of Powers" American Constitution Society Blog (6
December 2010), online: ACSLaw < http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/l7837> at para 2.
41. See Ross, Mills & Hecht, supra note 5 at 273.
42. Smith & Shearman, supra note 14 at 92-93; and see Thomas Trachsler, "Litigating Climate
Change in Canada" Emissions Trading and Climate Change Bulletin (December 2006), online:
McMillan Binch Mendelsohn <http://mcmillan.ca/Files/LitigatingClimateChange-Cda-1207.pdf>.
43. See Ross, Mills & Hecht, supra note 5 at 270. See also Howard C Kunreuther & Erwann 0
Michel-Kerjan, "Climate change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability
Challenge" (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1795.
44. For a review of climate change-related securities law claims, see Erion, supra note 14.
45. See the Kivalina decision where the plaintiffs alleged that defendants "conspired to create a false
scientific debate about global warming in order to deceive the public" and that some defendants had
known the impacts of climate change for years having begun research on climate change in the early
1970s; supra note 6.
46. See David Hunter & James Salzman, "Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate
Change Litigation" (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1741 at 1785.
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eco-labeling,47 and damages caused by failure to adapt to climate change,4 8
among others. The majority of tort cases to date have been in nuisance and
almost all of them have been in the US. 4 9 TO date, no climate change tort
cases have emerged in Canadian courts.
II. Uncertainty andjusticiability
Despite their recent growth in numbers, the novelty, complexity, and
sensitivities with respect to climate change cases have made judges
somewhat reluctant to become engaged in them. Courts are susceptible
to viewing these matters as being more appropriate for political decisionmakers than courts. Judges often believe that they lack the specialized
skills that are needed to address highly scientific evidence. 0 They
are more accustomed to relying on precedent and often less willing to
address new and emerging issues, no matter what their public importance
or national significance. These problems may be increased by judicial
concerns regarding the political ramifications of applying climate change
legislation and the enforceability of such decisions.
Some US and Canadian courts have used the issue of justiciability as
a means to avoid dealing with climate change matters. As noted above,
justiciability relates to the question of whether a matter is of the quality
or state of being appropriate or suitable for review by a court. In Canada,
justiciability issues encompass a number of inter-related doctrines
including ripeness, mootness, and political questions."' In the United
States, questions of standing are also generally considered.52
In the context of climate change litigation, the primary justiciability
argument that has arisen has been with respect to political questions.
The idea is that climate change is a political issue or, alternatively, has

47. One area in which there is little law or litigation is over the issue of misleading information
and advertising concerning the climate impact of activities. It is an issue which is raised in Kivalina
(supra note 6) and also in a recent complaint brought by the Australian Climate Justice Program and
Greenpeace concerning the use of the term "clean coal" to describe a coal power plant that will emit
over 2.4 million tones of GHGs annually. See Australian Climate Justice Program, Press Release,
"HRL challenged over 'clean coal' claims" (20 July 2007).
48. See Sabrina A Gherbaz & Patricia A Koval, "Unexpected Effects" (2008) online: ReNew Canada
<http://renewcanada.net/2008/unexpected-effects/>.
49. See Trachsler, supranote 43.
50. See Pidot, supra note 15 at 5-6.
51. See Sossin, supra note 3 at 24.
52. M Averill, "Getting into Court: Standing, Political Questions, and Climate Tort Claims" (2010)
19:1 RECIEL 122. It should be noted that in Friends ofthe Earth v Minister ofthe Environment and
Governor in Council, supra note 7, the Canadian Federal Court viewed justiciability as a component
of the test for public interest standing.
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been designated as political by Parliament or Congress and should not be
adjudicated upon by the courts."
Political questions generally concern moral, social or policy issues
that are either ill-suited for determination through an adversarial process
or which are inappropriate forjudicial intervention. Sossin sets out a range
of areas regarding which political questions may arise in Canada:
a.

matters that fail to raise legal issues, such as (i) purely political
disputes, (ii) disputes related to the legislative process, or
(iii) disputes over the wisdom or desirability of legislation or
government policy;

b. disputes regarding constitutional conventions;
c.

disputes regarding
prerogatives;

Parliamentary

privileges

and

Crown

d. disputes involving intergovernmental relations;
e.

disputes involving social or economic rights; and

f.

disputes involving the enforcement of international agreements,
the application of international law or the actions of foreign

states.5 4
The most pertinent of these areas in relation to climate change issues in
Canada concerns matters that are viewed as political disputes that fail to
raise legal issues.
The issue of political questions has been addressed quite differently
in Canada and the US. Traditionally, under the US "political questions
doctrine," American courts may decline jurisdiction where a matter is
likely to be subject to political action, whereas in Canada, courts could not
decline jurisdiction "as long as a matter raises a legal issue, even if in the
context of a politically contentious debate.""
Before delving into how these issues apply in the context of climate
change litigation in Canada, it is instructive to review how the political
questions doctrine has been applied in the land of its birth-the United
States.

53. See Sossin, supra note 3 at 25.
54. Ibid.
55. See Sossin, supra note 5 at 19; and see G Cowper & L Sossin, "Does Canada Need a Political
Questions Doctrine?"(2002) 16 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 343.
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1. The American approach
The US doctrine essentially stands for the proposition that a court should
avoid adjudicating cases that (i) require an initial policy determination
that necessitates political discretion, (ii) do not permit the application of
judicially discoverable standards, or (iii) require it to interfere with another
branch of government's constitutionally mandated dispute resolution
functions.16 The predominant US test for applying the doctrine is found in
the US Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Baker v Carr,which sets out six
possible constituents of a non-justiciable political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.57
Any one of these six Baker factors can be determinative, however, it must
be "inextricable from the case at bar."5 It is important to note that despite
the apparent latitude for application of these factors, relatively few cases
that involve political debate have been found to be non-justiciable. US
district courts have applied the doctrine, but the appeal courts have been
less prone to do so. 59 The doctrine has only twice been applied by the US

Supreme Court. 6 0
In Connecticut v American Electric Power (AEP), 6 1 the US District
Court dismissed the plaintiffs' climate change claim in nuisance for
56. Ibid at 138.
57. Baker v Carr,369 US 186 (1962) at 217 [numbers added].
58. Connecticut v American Electric Power Co, 582 F 3d 309 (2d Cir 2009) at 321 (quoting Baker at
217) [emphasis added] [AEP].
59. For instance, in Massachusettsv Environmental ProtectionAgency, supra note 29 at 1463, the
Court made short work of this issue and found that the EPA had authority to regulate GHG emissions
from mobile sources and, if it decided not to regulate these emissions, it "must ground its reasons for
action or inaction in the statute."
60. These two cases are Gilligan v Morgan 413 US 1 (1973), and Nixon v US 418 US 683 (1974).
Neither of these US Supreme Court cases involved either environmental issues or common law tort
claims. For commentary, see AEP, ibidat 321-322, referring to Rachel E Barkow, "More Supreme than
Court? The Role of the Political Question Doctrine & the Rise of Judicial Supremacy" (2002) 102
Colum L R 237 at 267-268); and also Comer v Murphy Oil 585 F 3d 855 (5th Cir 2009) at 873.
61. See Connecticut v American Electric Power Co Inc et al, (SDNY 2005) No 04 civ 5669 LAP and
No 04 civ 5670 LAP at 15.
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damages caused by coal-fired power plants, finding that climate change
will have widespread implications for the US economy, foreign relations,
and national security, and the remedies being sought were too broad
and extensive.62 On granting summary judgment to the defendants, the
Court relied on the second and third Baker factors. It stated: "none of the
pollution-as-public-nuisance cases cited by the Plaintiffs has touched on so
many areas of national and international policy. The scope and magnitude
of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently legislative nature of
this litigation."6
On appeal, the Second Circuit took a different view. Regarding the
complexity of linking GHG emissions to climate change, the appeal
court stressed that "federal courts have successfully adjudicated complex
common law public nuisance cases for over a century."' It observed
that there is "a long line of federal common law of nuisance cases where
federal courts employed familiar public nuisance precepts, grappled with
complex scientific evidence, and resolved the issues presented, based on
a fully developed record."6 It also remarked that the plaintiffs had not
asked for policy determinations, but only for a determination as to whether
the defendants had engaged in a public nuisance that has contributed to
the plaintiffs' injuries. The Second Circuit found that complexity was an
insufficient reason to deny jurisdiction and held that the political questions
doctrine did not apply.6 6 The proceedings were determined to bejusticiable.
The Second Circuit decision was appealed to the US Supreme Court.
Without dissent, the Court found that the US Clean Air Act and the
EPA's actions under it displace any US federal common law right to seek
abatement from CO 2 emissions from fossil-fuel power plants, even if no
such regulations are actually issued. The court reasoned that US federal
common law is displaced because if the EPA does not establish regulations,
states and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the matter and
the EPA's response will be reviewable in federal court. The Clean Air Act,
therefore, provides a means to seek limits on emissions from power plants,

62. Ibid at 19.
63. Ibid at 15.
64. AEP, supra note 58 at 326.
65. Ibid at 327. Note that in Kivalina the judge rejected the reasoning of the AEP court, asserting
that "the evaluation of a nuisance claim is not focused entirely on the unreasonableness of the harm.
Rather, the factfinder must also balance the utility and benefit of the alleged nuisance against the harm
caused," supra note 6 at 22-23.
66. AEP ibidat 329-330.
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which, arguably, is the same relief that the plaintiffs sought by using the
US federal common law. 67
Importantly, the Supreme Court did not overturn the US Second Circuit
Court's findings on justiciability and the political question doctrine. The
Court was divided (4-4) on the issue ofjusticiability and whether the issues
raised were political questions that are outside the scope of the federal
court's jurisdiction. Because the Court was evenly divided, the decision of
the Second Circuit on justiciability remains intact.
The case of Comer v Murphy Oil met a similar fate to AEP before
the District Court, but this too was overturned on appeal.68 The Fifth
Circuit in Comer examined whether the claims in question, for damages
caused by Hurricane Katrina, had been committed to a separate branch of
government. The Fifth Circuit's decision does not discuss the second and
third Baker formulations in detail, but observes that the defendants had not
"shown the absence of judicially discoverable or manageable standards
with which to decide this case." 69 The decision maintains that "the federal
courts are not free to invoke the political question doctrine to abstain from
deciding politically charged cases like this one, but must exercise their
jurisdiction as defined by Congress whenever a question is not exclusively
committed to another branch of the federal government." 0 The Fifth
Circuit also noted that "[c]ommon law tort claims are rarely thought to
present non-justiciable political questions."
In Kivalina,the District Court did not follow the reasoning of the appeal
court in AEP (the appeal decision in Comer had not yet been released)
and instead relied on the second and third Baker factors to dismiss the
claim, finding that the plaintiffs' case lacked judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.72 Kivalina involves a claim for
damages to an Alaskan community resulting from sea-level changes and
67. Connecticut v American Electric Power, 131 S Ct 2527. The decision does not fully close the
door on US climate change tort cases. Actions are still possible using state-based tort law. The decision
will however most likely lead to the dismissal of the appeal in Kivalina, supranote 6.
68. See Comer v Murphy Oil, supra note 59.
69. Ibid at 875.
70. Ibid at 873.
71. Ibid at 873-874.
72. Kivalina, supra note 6. For a good analysis of these cases, see Averill, supra note 52. See also
Californiav General Motors Corporation et al, No C06-05 755 M I1, where the suit was dismissed
on summary judgment, with the Court finding that any determination would "require the Court to
balance the competing interests of reducing global warming emissions and the interests of advancing
and preserving economic and industrial development. The balancing of those competing interests is
the type of initial policy determination to be made by the political branches, and not this Court."
See Matthew Skinner, Annette Hughes & Jonathon Pagan, "Climate Change Litigation: Courts Steer
Clear of Climate Change Suits" (October 2007), online: Allens <http://www.allens.com.aulpubs/cc/
foccoct07.htm>.
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increased severe storm activity caused by climate change. The lower court
judge in Kivalina found that the facts resulted in a situation in which it
was impossible to decide the case without an initial policy determination
which goes beyond judicial jurisdiction. As noted by Marilyn Averill, the
Judge found that the claims in Kivalina
would require the factfinder to weigh the utility, reliability, and safety of
various energy choices, and balance these against the risks of flooding
due to global warming. Citing the global nature of the sources of GHGs
and their impacts, the judge concluded that the 'Plaintiffs' global
warming nuisance claim seeks to impose liability and damages on a scale
unlike any prior environmental pollution case cited by Plaintiffs. These
cases do not provide guidance that would enable the Court to reach a
resolution of this case in any "reasoned manner.""
The Kivalina District Court decision is presently under appeal before the
US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.74
Given these US court decisions, it would appear that the role of the
political questions doctrine is quite limited. In fact, in AEP the Second
Circuit concluded its political questions analysis by finding that:
given the nature of federal common law, where Congress may, by
legislation, displace common law standards by its own statutory or
regulatory standards and require courts to follow those standards, there
is no need for the protections of the political question doctrine."
The US appeal courts rarely apply the doctrine and have a well-structured
test in Baker v Carrwhen they do apply it.
2. The Canadianapproach
With respect to policy-related issues, the law of justiciability in Canada is
often viewed as fragmented. There are two general streams of Canadian
caselaw concerning political questions that have been described in the
literature. The first stream stems from the Supreme Court of Canada
decisions in Operation Dismantle v the Queen76 and Finlay v Canada
(Minister of Finance)." In Operation Dismantle, then Chief Justice
73. See Averill, ibid at 124.
74. See "Eroding Alaska Village Appeals Lawsuit Dismissal", New York Times (28 January 2010)
online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/01/28/us/AP-US-GlobalWarming-Erosion.html>.
75. See AEP, supra note 58 at 332. The District Court judge in Kivalina seemed to want "the
political branches to set policy in order to provide standards for the courts to apply in climate cases,
while the judges in AEP and Comerregard a nuisance claim as a way to resolve disputes in the absence
of federal policy." See Averill, supra note 52.
76. OperationDismantleInc v Canada, [ 1985] 1 SCR 441 [OperationDismantle].
77. Finlay v Canada (Ministerof Finance), [1986] 2 SCR 607 [Finlay].
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Dickson stated that "disputes of a political or foreign policy nature may
be properly cognizable by the Courts." Madam Justice Wilson added that
courts are "called upon all the time to decide questions of law, principle
and policy" and that "the Courts should not be too eager to relinquish their
judicial review function simply because they are called upon to exercise
it in relation to weighty matters of state."" Based on this and similar
reasoning in Finlay, it has been generally argued that a court should not
decline to hear a case just because its political dimensions could be more
effectively addressed by another branch of government." Some, including
Peter Hogg, have found this to mean that "there is no political questions
doctrine in Canada." 0 The rationale here is that the US political questions
doctrine arises due to the unique US separation of powers, which is distinct
from the situation in Canada."
The second stream is based on the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions in Canada (Auditor General) v Canada (Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources) and Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC),
where the Court found that matters that are "purely political" or do not raise
a "sufficient legal component" should not be decided by the courts, but
instead should be left for politicians to address.82 Based on this reasoning,
if a case does not present a genuine legal argument or is inextricably bound
up with political questions, then it is not justiciable."
The two streams start from distinct positions when addressing the
justiciability of policy-related matters. The Operation Dismantle stream
starts from the position that, with some exceptions, most policy-related
matters should be justiciable, while the Auditor General stream starts
from the position that most policy-related matters should be left to the

See Sossin, supra note 3 at 148; and OperationDismantle, ibid at 459, 465, and 471-472.
See Sossin, supra note 3 at 153. In Finlay,Le Dain J stated that the court should not:
... decline to determine it on the ground that because of its policy context or its implications
it is better left for review and determination by the legislative or executive branch of
government;
supra note 77, at 632.
80. See P Hogg, Constitutional Lav in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 33.5.
81. Note however that although the US doctrine is rooted in the US constitutional balance of powers,
its principles arguably may be universally applied by courts in democratic societies. See Sossin, supra
note 3 at 139. As in the United States, Canadian courts must retain their "proper role within the
constitutional framework of our democratic form of government" and determine whether a matter
has a "sufficient legal component to warrant the intervention of the judicial branch." See Reference re
CanadaAssistance Plan (BC), [ 1991] 2 SCR 525 at 545.
82. See Sossin, ibid at 171-172; and see Canada(Auditor General) v Canada (Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources), [ 1989] 2 SCR 49 [Auditor General] and Reference re CanadaAssistance Plan
(BC), ibid.
83. See Sossin, ibid.
78.
79.
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legislature. In regard to references, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Reference Re Secession of Quebec stated:
the circumstances in which the Court may decline to answer a reference
question on the basis of non-justiciability include:
(i) if to do so would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its
proper role in the constitutional framework of our democratic form
of government or
(ii) if the Court could not give an answer that lies within its area of
expertise: the interpretation of law.84
This open-ended test essentially brings the two Canadian streams
together but does not provide the range of considerations and guidance
that Baker v Carrprovides and, thus, lacks clarity as to the scope of the
court's discretion. This test advocates for pragmatism and flexibility by
judges when determining justiciability, asserting that judges must exercise
discretion in regulating their own jurisdiction subject to the priorities of
the legislature.85 But if given too much pragmatism, the rule of law and the
provision of access to justice may suffer. This is evidenced when non-legal
considerations, such as political consequences or unfamiliarity with the
legal and policy issues, come into play.
The weaknesses inherent in the Canadian use of judicial discretion
and pragmatic considerations in determining justiciability are evident in
the Canadian Federal Court's 2008 decision regarding the implementation
of Canada's climate change legislation. In Friends of the Earth Canada
v Minister of the Environment and Governor in Council, the open-ended
Canadian approach to determining the justiciability of policy-related
matters allowed the Court to use its discretion to steer clear of the climate
change issue, which a more principled approach such as that in Baker v
Carrwould have likely compelled it to tackle.

84. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 26. Sossin argues that using this
approach, a court first determines if there is a legal question posed. If so, the court determines if
the legal question has a significant extralegal component. If it does, then the court must determine
whether it can sever the extralegal component and answer the legal question narrowly. If so, the matter
is justiciable; if not, the matter is not justiciable. See Sossin, ibid at 155. This test may only apply to
references.
85. See Sossin, ibid at 199. See also Robert Sharpe, "Mootness, Abstract Questions and Alternative
Grounds: Deciding Whether to Decide" in R Sharpe, ed, CharterLitigation (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987) at 330.

546 The Dalhousie Law Journal
In June 2007, the Canadian Parliament passed the Kyoto Protocol
Implementation Act (KPIA). 6 Its passage was opposed by the ruling
minority government, but it was passed in the House of Commons and
Senate by the opposition parties. The Act sets mandatory obligations and
deadlines that the federal government was required to meet including the
publication of a "climate change plan" setting out measures that ensure that
Canada meets its Kyoto commitments, the publishing of draft regulations,
the holding of public consultations on the draft regulations, and the
enactment of final regulations. After these deadlines passed, a Canadian
non-governmental organization, Friends of the Earth Canada, filed judicial
review applications seeking declaratory and mandatory relief to compel
the government to take more effective measures to combat climate change
and to comply with the Act. Friends of the Earth requested the court to
determine whether Canada had fulfilled three specific duties established
under the Act." It based its arguments on the position that the government
had ignored the rule of law and the will of Parliament."
The Federal Court (Trial Division) heard the case in June 2008.
Without the benefit of a principled test providing guidance for determining
whether the matter was justiciable, the Court undertook an analysis of
Parliament's intent in making the legislation, assessing: the discretion
given to the executive in implementing the Act, the interconnected nature
of the policy and legal attributes of the Act, and its enforceability.89
Finding that the Act uses permissive language, deals with discretionary
matters, and provides an alternative remedy in its reporting requirements,
the Court concluded that the KPIA was not an appropriate matter to be
adjudicated by the Court.90 It held that Parliament's intent must have been

86. Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, SC 2007, c 30 [KPIA]. In December 2011 the Canadian
government formally announced Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocoland in April 2012 it
announced its intention to repeal the KPIA.
87. These duties are set out in sections 5, 7, and 8 of the KPIA, ibid.
88. For an overview of the KPIA and the judicial proceedings, see Robert Dufresne, "Kyoto Protocol
Implementation Act: Implementation and Consequences" (Ottawa Parliamentary Information and
Research Service, 2008) (PRB 07-40E), online: <http://amicus.collectionscanada.gc.ca>.
89. In this regard, the Court examined whether (i) some KPIA compliance measures were "policyladen considerations" and outside the realm of judicial review; (ii) the Act contemplates an ongoing
process of review and adjustment; (iii) cooperative initiatives would be required that are not within
the complete control of the government; and (iv) the Act itself recognizes that the implementation of
any given climate change plan may not be accomplished in any given year. See Friends of the Earthv
Minister of the Environment and Governor in Council, supra note 7 paras 33-35.
90. See Dianne Saxe, "Why Should the Government be Above the Law?" (2010) Journal of
Parliamentary and Political Law, for a critique of the decision, also available online: SLAW <http://
www.slaw-ca>.
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for Parliament to monitor and enforce the Act on its own9' through censure
or non-binding resolutions 92 and that this provided an adequate alternative
remedy to using the courts to enforce the Act.93
To reach this finding, the Court undertook a contextual analysis
of the KPIA. It reasoned, in essence, that as some subsections of the
KPIA appeared as discretionary in their manner of implementation,
implementation of other-apparently mandatory-aspects of the Act were
also discretionary. 94 This logic essentially leads to the premise that the mere
existence of discretionary elements in a statute may mean that compliance
with other aspects of the statute is non-justiciable. This is difficult to
follow, particularly in a case where the exercise of such discretion runs
counter to the objects and purposes of the Act.95
91. This reasoning was based on the fact that the KPIA includes several public monitoring and
reporting requirements. However, public reporting provisions are found in other environmental
legislation and these provisions have never been found to be a bar to justiciability. In fact, reporting
requirements are typical features of environmental statutes and other public welfare legislation. See,
for example, Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, ss 16.3, 19(3),19(9), 22, 36,
40(4), 55; Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999, SC 1999, c 33, ss 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, I1;
Federal Sustainable Development Act, SC 2008, c 33, ss 3, 7; Department of the Environment Act,
SC 1985, ss 5, 8. The court's finding in Friends of the Earth that reporting requirements in a statute
oust the jurisdiction of the courts raises issues of broad application regarding the interpretation and
justiciability of such statutes.
92. Interestingly, the justiciability of the Act was discussed in detail in the Canadian Senate with a
Government Senator predicting judicial review under the KPIA if the Kyoto targets were not met. See
Debates of the Senate, 39th Parl, Ist Sess, 143:43 (28 March 2007) at 1510; and Senate, Proceedings
of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, 39th Parl,
1st Sess, No 18 (8 May 2007). However, even if the Act was regarded as creating a "duty owed to
Parliament" that would not usually negate judicial review. See R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [1995] 2 All ER 244 (HL) at 272, per Lord Lloyd.
93. Concerning the finding that alternative remedies existed, the court found that the KPIA's
provisions on reporting on progress on implementation to the public and Parliament set up a regime for
accountability, which was intended to exclude any recourse to the courts. The court relied on Canadian
Union ofPublic Employees (CUPE) v Canada (Minister of Health), [2004] FCJ 1582 at paras 35 and
36, where the Federal Court found that the Minister's obligation to report to Parliament was an issue
for Parliament to enforce rather than the courts. In that case, the respondent's statutory responsibilities
were owed solely to Parliament and the respondent had discretion over what to report. In the Friends
of the Earth case, the respondents had additional public reporting obligations, and the Act has strict
requirements concerning what to report to the public with strict deadlines for doing so, in order to
facilitate public comment. See KPIA, supra note 86, ss 5(3), 8, 9(2), 10(2), and 10.1(2).
94. Friends ofthe Earth v Minister of the Environment, supra note 7 at para 33.
95. See Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) v Ontario (Minister of Labour), supra note
94 at paras 94-95; Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] AC 997 (HL) at
1030. In fact, the court never attempted to ascertain the objects and purposes of the KPIA, supra
note 86, ss 3, 5(l)(a), and 7. See Re: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21. Canada's
international law commitments (such as the Kyoto Protocol) should be seen as a guide to "inform the
contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review." See Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 70. See also R v Hope, 2007 SCC 26 at paras
53-54, where the Supreme Court of Canada found that courts should "strive to avoid constructions of
domestic law pursuant to which the state would be in violation of its international obligations, unless
the wording of the statute clearly compels that result."
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Section 3 of the KPIA states that the purpose of the Act is:
to ensure that Canada takes effective and timely action to meet its
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and help address the problem of
global climate change. 96
Although the relevant operative provisions in the KPIA also use apparently
mandatory language, stating that the government shall set out measures
that "ensure" that Canada meets its Kyoto obligations, the court found that
the use of the word "ensure" in this context was not mandatory. It reasoned
that the obligations on the government to address failings in its climate
change measures are not compliance tasks, but an indication of a need for
a gradual and incremental approach to addressing climate change.
Friends of the Earth had argued that the issues at stake were limited
to questions of statutory compliance and the rule of law, stressing that
although policy decisions formed part of the backdrop of the case, the
court was not required to decide any political or policy issues. In its
eyes, the focus of the dispute was whether the government had complied
with specific requirements of the KPIA, which is a question of statutory
interpretation and is therefore justiciable.97 The Court, however, found that
the KPIA "couples the responsibility of ensuring Kyoto compliance with a
series of stated measures some of which are well outside the proper realm
of judicial review." It found it inappropriate to parse the legislation into
justiciable and non-justiciable components.
It can be argued that this approach contradicts the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re: Secession of Quebec in which the full
court stated":
As to the 'legal'nature of the questions posed, if the Court is of the opinion
that it is being asked a question with a significant extralegal component,
it may interpret the question so as to answer only its legal aspects; if this

96. KPIA, supra note 86, s 3.
97. See Reference re CanadaAssistance Plan (BC), supra note 80 at para 28. See also Saxe, supra
note 91, who notes that the Court was not asked whether Canada should comply with the Kyoto
Protocol(that question was answered twice by Parliament through ratification of the Protocol and then
by passing the KPIA), nor was the Court asked to decide how Canada should comply with its Kyoto
commitments (which under the KPIA is left to the government to decide), but instead it was narrowly
asked whether Canada had complied with its specific obligations under sections 5, 7, and 8 of the
KPIA.
98. Friendsofthe Earth v Minister of the Environment, supra note 7 at para 33.
99. See also Sossin, supranote 3, who states at 155:
If the question does have a significant extralegal component, and the Court can answer the
question narrowly, severing the extralegal aspects of the question, then it should answer the
question; however, if the extralegal component cannot be severed, the Court should decline
to answer the question.
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is not possible, the Court may decline to answer the question. In the
present Reference the questions may clearly be interpreted as directed
to legal issues, and, so interpreted, the Court is in a position to answer
them.too

In Re: Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court found that adherence to
the constitutional principle of democracy required that a "clear majority"
of Quebecers answering a "clear question" in a referendum would need
to be achieved in order for Quebec to secede from Canada. However, the
precise percentage of votes needed and the precise language used in the
referendum question were political questions that were beyond the remit
of the court to determine."o' Thus, it was the interpretation of the legal
framework for determining how secession could be achieved that was
justiciable. Similarly, in Friends of the Earth the questions posed to the
Court were not how compliance could be achieved but an interpretation
of the law to determine whether the government was required to take
the steps to facilitate political decisions on how to achieve compliance.
Although the case did not require the Court to engage in a public policy
debate or to determine what actions must be taken, the Court elected to
engage in just such a debate. The Court appeared to place significant
reliance on the government's predictions that compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol would lead Canada into an economic recession. Rather than
answering the question of statutory interpretation that was before it, the
Court questioned the wisdom of Parliament and delved into the pros or
cons of the implementation of the Act. In sum, the Court based its decision
on the political nature of the government's response to the KPIA, rather
than determining whether the questions had a sufficient legal component
to be answered by the court.
Finally, the Court conflated the concepts of justiciability and
enforceability by analyzing whether Parliament intended the KPIA to
be enforced by the courts. Sossin emphasizes that justiciability and
enforceability are two distinct concepts.102 In his analysis of the decision,
he states that:
Justiciability, [in the view of the Court in the Friends of the Earth
decision], is tied not only to the subject matter of a dispute but to the court's
remedial reach. This approach, however, ignores important principles
from other spheres of Canadian public law. Courts have articulated the
scope of constitutional conventions in significant detail, for example,
100. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 84 at para 28.
101. See Sossin, supra note 3 at 156.
102. Ibid at 7.
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while noting that such standards are unenforceable. Additionally, it is
always open to a court to issue a declaratory remedy when the scope
of intervention is limited. In my view, the focus on remedies, like the
focus on rights, places undue and unwise limits on judicial oversight
for potential abuse of discretionary authority, including the fettering of
discretion where an oversight jurisdiction is conferred but not exercised
by the appropriate government officials. 03
In other words, it appears the Court considered its ability to enforce
the KPIA, in the sense of imposing intrusive remedies, to be a central
consideration in determining justiciability. But the key issue when
assessing justiciability is whether there is a sufficient legal component to
the issue before the court, not whether Parliament intended the courts to
enforce the Act with specific or intrusive remedies.
The wide discretion used by Canadian courts in determining the
justiciability of policy-related issues may allow courts to become more
influenced by the political ramifications and enforceability of their
decisions than by the need for maintaining the rule of law. As noted above,
this is highlighted by Alexander Bickel, who, writing in the context of civil
rights litigation in the United States, noted that courts may sometimes be
sensitive to the political climate of the country and make their judgments

accordingly.104
If too much judicial discretion and pragmatism is used in the
determination ofjusticiability, significant problems arise in the application
of key foundational principles in our system of law including the rule of
law and access to justice. Justiciability is a heavy weapon in the judicial
arsenal, which ought to be used sparingly and not to obstruct the proper
administration of justice. It would thus be appropriate for Canadian courts
to adopt a more principled test for addressing issues of justiciability along
the lines of the US approach in Baker v Carr.A more principled approach
would focus on ensuring legal accountability for legal determinations and
political accountability for political determinations. Interpreting statutes
has a legal component notwithstanding what the political implications
might be. As long as courts have the functional capacity to adjudicate
(i.e., the matter is not predicated on judgments which are not suited to
the judicial process such as matters of faith, or matters not amenable to
evidence, etc.), the courts would have, under this approach, the obligation
to adjudicate.

103. Lome Sossin, "The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli: Justiciability, Discretion and the Limits of
the Rule of Law" (2010) 55:3 McGill LJ 661.
104. See Bickel, supra note 3 at 174, quoted in Sossin, supra note 3 at 229.
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This more principled approach should address the issue from the
standpoint adopted in Operation Dismantle that most policy-related
matters are justiciable, with certain exceptions. Based on Baker v Carr,
these exceptions should be enumerated to include:
a.

a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department;

b. a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it;
c.

the impossibility ofdeciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;

d. the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government;
e.

an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or

f.

the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 05

The test in Re: Secession of Quebec provides a basis for analysis of
political questions, but it opens the door to pragmatism and flexibility
which should be constrained through a more principled approach. This
would help ensure that courts are given sufficient guidance on how to
approach justiciability and avoid outcomes such as that in the Friends of
the Earth case.
Conclusions
Justiciability addresses whether a court should adjudicate on a matter or
not. Courts will consider the intent of the legislature, the place of the court
in the constitutional context, and the nature of the problem before the
court.' 0 6 Without a strong test providing the courts with guidance on how
to exercise their discretion in determining justiciability, Canadian courts
have produced an undisciplined range of decisions touching on these
issues. Although Canadian courts have traditionally been viewed as less
receptive to non-justiciability arguments than those in the US, the opposite
may be becoming true.

105. Baker v Carr, supra note 57 at 217 (numbers added).
106. See Sossin, supra note 3 at 230.
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A more definitive idea of the direction that the political questions
doctrine is taking in the context of climate change cases in the US
will be known after the Ninth Circuit Court addresses the issue in the
Kivalina appeal. In Canada, where climate change legislation is not on the
horizon and the test for the justiciability of policy-related issues provides
little guidance to courts on the exercise of discretion, the timing of the
resolution of these issues is less certain. A more principled approach to the
justiciability of policy-related issues is needed in Canada. As noted above,
this could be structured based on the exceptions set out in Baker v Carr.
Some commentators have made analogies between climate change
litigation and the tobacco lawsuits in the 1990s. It is interesting to
note, as elaborated by Farber, that US litigation against the tobacco and
asbestos industries proceeded cautiously at first, then over time gained
traction with the courts. 0 The current climate change cases are "paving
the way" by getting courts familiar with addressing climate change
issues and adjusting to the complexities of these cases, thereby laying the
foundations for future litigation where the courts may be more amendable
to tackling these types of issues. As the harm caused by climate change
becomes more prevalent, climate change claims are likely to increase
in the future,' necessitating that the courts develop the expertise and
willingness to effectively adjudicate these matters. But the courts will only
be in a position to make these changes once the barriers of the justiciability
of climate change matters are resolved.

107. Daniel A Farber, "Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change" (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev
1606 at 1616.
108. Daniel J Grimm, "Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed Model for Allocating
Tort Damages Among C02 Producers" (2007) 32 Colum J Envtl L 209 at 210. Some commentators
predict that the payouts from climate change suits will make the damages ordered in the tobacco and
asbestos cases of the past look like "pocket money." See, for example, Ingham, supra note 12.

